Adina Akbik

Senior Assistant Professor of European Politics

Procedural vs substantive accountability in EMU governance: between payoffs and trade-offs


Journal article


Mark Dawson, Adina Maricut‐Akbik
Journal of European Public Policy, 2021

DOI
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Cite

APA   Click to copy
Dawson, M., & Maricut‐Akbik, A. (2021). Procedural vs substantive accountability in EMU governance: between payoffs and trade-offs. Journal of European Public Policy.


Chicago/Turabian   Click to copy
Dawson, Mark, and Adina Maricut‐Akbik. “Procedural vs Substantive Accountability in EMU Governance: between Payoffs and Trade-Offs.” Journal of European Public Policy (2021).


MLA   Click to copy
Dawson, Mark, and Adina Maricut‐Akbik. “Procedural vs Substantive Accountability in EMU Governance: between Payoffs and Trade-Offs.” Journal of European Public Policy, 2021.


BibTeX   Click to copy

@article{mark2021a,
  title = {Procedural vs substantive accountability in EMU governance: between payoffs and trade-offs},
  year = {2021},
  journal = {Journal of European Public Policy},
  author = {Dawson, Mark and Maricut‐Akbik, Adina}
}

Abstract

ABSTRACT This article introduces a new normative framework for analysing accountability in the European Union’s Economic and Monetary Union (EMU). The framework is anchored in four normative ‘goods’ that accountability is supposed to ensure: openness, non-arbitrariness, effectiveness, and publicness. All of these can be achieved in a procedural or substantive way, depending on whether actors are held accountable for the quality of their decision-making processes or for the actual merit of their decisions. Transposed to EMU, this conceptualisation shows both the payoffs and trade-offs of prioritising procedural accountability. Using different examples across EMU governance, the article illustrates how current mechanisms of political, legal, and administrative accountability predominantly evaluate the procedures followed by EU institutions when performing their tasks. While such an approach can bring clarity, predictability, and autonomy for the actors involved, it distracts attention from the substantive assessment of EMU decisions. The article contributes to the EMU accountability literature by going beyond principal-agent expectations of democratic control rooted in the nation-state or legal debates about principles for accountable behaviour found in EU Treaties. The EMU, and the EU more broadly, need a different perspective on accountability focused on generally-applicable standards for holding power to account.


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